Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Articles

Faculty

2016

Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice
Savings Program Act
Edward A. Zelinsky
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, zelinsky@yu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act,
2016 University of Illinois Law Review 173 (2016).
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/523

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information,
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

ZELINSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2016 1:55 PM

RETIREMENT IN THE LAND OF
LINCOLN: THE ILLINOIS SECURE
CHOICE SAVINGS PROGRAM ACT
Edward A. Zelinsky*
In 2015, Illinois became the first state to enact a state-mandated
and state-operated retirement system for private sector employers:
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act. The Illinois program resembles a system approved by the California legislature—a
system that has not yet been enacted since it is conditioned on an additional vote by the legislature. Illinois’ program and the one proposed in California have notable differences in that (1) the Illinois retirement accounts will qualify as individual retirement accounts
(“IRAs”) under the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”); (2) the Illinois
IRAs will be Roth IRAs; (3) the California program requires participation by firms with five or more employees, rather than twenty-five
or more as mandated by the Illinois law; (4) the Illinois law accepts
the status of its private sector retirement plan as governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), as long as both
Illinois employers and the state incur no liability from that status; and
(5) the Illinois law does not provide procedures by which employers
may supplement employees’ contributions to the state-mandated fund.
While the Illinois law will pass legal muster under both ERISA
and the Code, it is less clear that its arrangement is sound as a matter
of policy. Furthermore, there is great irony in the fact that the legislatures of two states that have failed to properly fund the pensions of
their public employees instead choose to address the private sector’s
retirement challenges. Nevertheless, the Illinois law is superior to the
law proposed in California, and it may result in improved private sector savings.
This Article acknowledges the widespread concern that workers
are not saving enough for retirement and notes that the Illinois law
provides an important first contribution to attempts at remedying the
retirement savings problem through a state-mandated program. This
Article further encourages widespread experimentation among the
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states to determine which policies—if any—effectively encourage retirement savings.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Illinois has now become the first state to complete legislative enactment of a state-mandated, state-operated retirement system for pri1
vate employers. The Illinois General Assembly is not the first state legislature to approve such a system. The California legislature holds that
2
title. The Golden State’s legislature, however, conditioned that state’s
private sector retirement program upon an additional vote of the Cali3
fornia legislature which has yet to occur. Thus, Illinois is now the first
state to complete the legislative process to authorize a state-run retire4
ment system for private employers.
As it debated, the Illinois General Assembly had before it the bill
adopted earlier by California’s legislature. The Illinois legislation, as enacted and signed by the governor, bears obvious similarities to the earlier
adopted California law. The Illinois statute, however, also makes five notable departures from the California legislation.
First, the Illinois law requires the allocation of investment gains and
losses, as well as administrative expenses, to the private sector retirement

1. See Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1–80/95 (2015).
2. See California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–
100044 (West 2012). For discussion of the California law, see Edward A. Zelinsky, California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547 (2014).
3. S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
4. While the Illinois Act authorizes the state-operated private sector retirement arrangement,
the funds to implement the Illinois arrangement must still be appropriated by the legislature or obtained from other sources. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(m), 93.

ZELINSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

1/26/2016 1:55 PM

RETIREMENT IN THE LAND OF LINCOLN

175

5

savings accounts authorized by the law. Thus, unlike the formula-based,
6
cash-balance accounts established by the California Act, the Illinois accounts will qualify as individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) under the
7
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). Second, the IRAs established under
8
the Illinois program will be Roth IRAs. Third, the Illinois Act requires
participation by all Illinois employers with twenty-five or more employ9
ees who lack their own retirement savings plans for their employees.
The California law, if confirmed by a second legislative vote, would
mandate participation by much smaller firms with five or more employees if such firms have no retirement savings plans for their respective
10
11
workers. Fourth, the Illinois Act—unlike the Golden State’s law —
accepts the status of the Illinois private sector retirement plan as governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
12
(“ERISA”) as long as Illinois employers and the state itself incur no li13
ability from that status. Finally, the Illinois Act—in contrast to the Cali14
fornia statute —provides no explicit procedures for employers to supplement their employees’ contributions to the Illinois fund with
15
employer contributions.
As a legal matter, the Illinois private sector retirement plan will
pass muster under both the Code and ERISA. The Illinois accounts will
16
qualify as Roth IRAs under the Code. The Illinois program will not be
an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan but rather will be an IRA
17
payroll deposit arrangement. Even if the Illinois arrangement is an
ERISA-governed plan, Illinois employers and the state itself will have no
18
ERISA liability.

5. Id. § 30(d), (n).
6. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e).
7. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a).
8. Id. § 5 (defining “IRA”).
9. Id. (defining “employer”). Employers will not be subject to the Illinois Act until they have
“been in business at least 2 years.” Id.
10. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000(d), 100032(b)–(d).
11. Id. § 100043.
12. ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012). ERISA lawyers generally cite the provisions of the statute while the courts tend to cite the same provisions as codified in Title 29 of the U.S.
Code. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 98 (5th ed. 2010). In the
text of this article, I cite the relevant provisions as designated in ERISA and then, in appropriate footnotes, indicate the designation as codified in Title 29.
13. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95.
14. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(k) (authorizing the board to “[a]llow participating employers to
make their own contributions”).
15. Sections 15(a) and 25(3) of the Illinois Act address the possibility that employers will make
supplemental contributions to the Illinois fund. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a), 25(3). Section 25(3)
contemplates that the board will manage “contributions paid by employees and employers” in accordance with traditional fiduciary standards while section 15(a) refers to “moneys received from enrollees
and participating employers.” Id. There is currently no explicit statutory authority authorizing employer contributions to the Illinois fund, however.
16. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.A–B.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
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That the Illinois private sector retirement arrangement qualifies under the Code and ERISA as a matter of law does not mean that this arrangement is sound as a matter of policy. There is widespread agreement
that many workers are not saving enough for retirement and that this is
19
cause for concern. There is, however, substantial disagreement about
the appropriate response to this problem. The choices made by Illinois’
legislators are noteworthy because they represent the choices of the first
state to authorize a state-operated, state-mandated private sector retirement program. Those choices are thus an important contribution to a
critical national debate, but they will not end that debate. In that debate,
I favor widespread experimentation by the states to determine which, if
any, policies will effectively and efficiently encourage retirement savings.
II. THE ILLINOIS ACT’S SIMILARITIES TO THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE
As the similarity of its name suggests, the Illinois Secure Choice
20
Savings Program Act tracks in important respects the earlier-adopted
21
California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act. The board
22
which will administer the Illinois program, like its California counter23
part, includes public officials serving ex officio as well as gubernatorial
24
25
appointees. Also like the California Act, the Illinois statute reiterates
that the state is not guaranteeing and is not responsible for any amounts
26
contributed by employees to the state-operated retirement fund.
27
Also emulating the California law, the Illinois statute mandates
that each covered employer that does not sponsor a qualified retirement
plan must participate in the Illinois retirement program for the private
19. See, e.g., NARI RHEE & ILANA BOIVIE, THE CONTINUING RETIREMENT SAVINGS CRISIS 1
(2015), available at http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/RSC%202015/final_rsc_2015.pdf
(“The average working household has virtually no retirement savings.”); Scott Cooley, Illinois Retirement Initiative Could Blaze a Path for Other States, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 26, 2015), http://ibd.morning
star.com/article/article.asp?id=681027&CN=brf295,http://ibd.morningstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inp
uts=days=14;frmtId=12,%20brf295 (“There is an acute need for additional workplace savings programs in this country. An estimated 50% of adult private-sector workers in the United States lack
access to an employer-sponsored retirement program, with lower-income workers particularly unlikely
to have a plan available.”); Eduardo Porter, Americans Aren’t Saving Enough for Retirement, But One
Change Could Help, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/business/
americans-arent-saving-enough-for-retirement-but-one-change-could-help.html?_r=0.
20. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1.
21. S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
22. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/20.
23. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(a) (West 2012).
24. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/20. Gubernatorial appointees must be approved by the state treasurer and the state senate. Id. § 20(e).
25. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), 100036.
26. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a) (providing that the fund established by the Act is “a trust outside of the State treasury”); id. § 15(b) (providing that contributed funds “shall not constitute property
of the State” and “the State shall have no claim to or against, or interest in” the funds contributed by
employees to their retirement accounts); id. § 50 (“The State shall have no liability for the payment of
any benefit to any participant in the Program.”); id. § 55(c)(9) (“[T]he Program Fund is not guaranteed by the State.”); id. § 70(a) (“The State shall have no duty or liability to any party for the payment
of any retirement savings benefits accrued by any individual under the Program.”).
27. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100032(b)–(d).
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28

sector. Specifically, each covered Illinois employer must “establish a
29
payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement.” Small Illinois employers, i.e., those with fewer than twenty-five employees, may elect to partic30
ipate in the program just as California employers with fewer than five
31
employees may elect coverage of the California program.
32
Like the California program, the Illinois preretirement plan utilizes automatic enrollment of employees. If an employer is covered by the
Illinois state program (because the employer has twenty-five or more
employees but lacks a qualified retirement plan for its employees or because the employer elects coverage in the Illinois program), each of the
covered employer’s employees will automatically be enrolled in the Illi33
nois program. If such an automatically enrolled employee takes no action, three percent of his or her salary will be withheld by the employer
pursuant to the statutorily-mandated “payroll deposit retirement savings
34
arrangement.” The employer will remit the compensation withheld to
35
the Illinois state fund to finance a Roth IRA for such employee. Like
36
his or her California counterpart, an Illinois employee will have the
37
right to opt out of the state-sponsored retirement coverage. Illinois employees will also be able to increase or decrease the amount withheld
from his or her salary for remission to the employee’s IRA in the state38
operated private sector retirement system.
Like the state-maintained private retirement plan to be established
39
under the California statute, the Illinois Act conditions the implementation of the Illinois plan upon the qualification of the Illinois accounts as
40
IRAs under the Code.
III. THE ILLINOIS ACT’S FIVE DIFFERENCES FROM THE CALIFORNIA
STATUTE
The first difference between the two states’ respective laws is that
the California statute, if confirmed by a second legislative vote, will
mandate participation by smaller employers than will the Illinois law.
The Illinois act requires an employer to participate in the statesponsored program only if the Illinois employer has twenty-five or more

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60.
Id. § 60(a).
Id. § 5 (defining “small employer”); id. § 60(b).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(a).
Id. § 100032(e)(1).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60(b).
Id. § 60(a)–(c).
Id. § 65.
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100014(e), 100032(e)(1).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(i), 55(d), 60(b), (h).
Id. 80/30(i), 80/55(d), 80/60(c).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95.
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41

employees and lacks its own qualified retirement plan. In contrast, the
California program will require employers with five or more employees
to participate in the Golden State’s plan if they do not maintain their
42
own qualified retirement savings scheme for their employees.
Second, the Illinois Act was drafted with greater sensitivity to the
Code’s definition of an individual account than was the California law.
The California statute, if confirmed by a second legislative vote without
amendment, will require the Golden State’s private sector retirement
savings program to utilize cash-balance-style accounts which do not qual43
ify as IRAs under the Code. These notional accounts will utilize a defined-benefit-type formula based on an assumed interest rate selected by
44
the board. These formula-based, cash-balance accounts will not qualify
as IRAs since investment gains and losses and administrative expenses
45
will not be allocated directly to such cash balance accounts.
On the other hand, the Illinois Act specifies that the board running
the Illinois fund shall “[e]stablish the process by which interest, investment earnings, and investment losses are allocated to individual program
46
accounts” under the plan. The Illinois Act also requires that administra47
tive expenses be allocated to individual accounts “on a pro rata basis.”
Such allocation of investment gains, investment losses, and administrative expenses is the hallmark of an individual account under the Code
48
and ERISA. Reinforcing the status of the Illinois program accounts as
IRAs is the participants’ ability to direct the investment of their respec49
tive accounts from among options selected by the board. Such self50
directed investing is also emblematic of an individual account rather
than the kind of defined-benefit-style notional account established by the
California Act.
Third, the Illinois law specifies that the IRAs established under that
51
state’s private sector retirement plan will all be Roth IRAs. Fourth, California’s Act provides that, if the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”)
concludes that the California program would be an ERISA-governed
52
employee benefit plan, the program is to be abandoned. In a subtle and
41. Id. § 5 (defining “employer”). In addition, an Illinois employer is covered by the Act only if
it “has been in business at least 2 years.” Id.
42. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000(d), 100032(d).
43. Zelinksy, supra note 2, at 567–68.
44. Id. at 568.
45. Id. at 567–68.
46. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(d); see also id. 80/50.
47. Id. § 30(n).
48. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2012); I.R.C. § 414(i) (2012). These statutory provisions are discussed below.
49. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/45(a), 60(d).
50. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(5)(A). Self-directed accounts are discussed below. On selfdirected accounts, see LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION
AND WELFARE BENEFITS 42–43 (3d ed. 2012); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 670–78.
51. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (providing that for purposes of the statute, “‘IRA’ means a Roth
IRA (individual retirement account) under Section 408A of the Internal Revenue Code.”) (parenthetical in original).
52. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043 (West 2012).
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important difference, the Illinois Act acknowledges the possibility that
the Illinois private sector retirement plan might be an ERISA-covered
53
employee benefit plan. Nevertheless, the board can proceed with the
Illinois private sector retirement program if—notwithstanding the status
of that program as an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan—neither
54
the state nor any Illinois employer has liability under ERISA.
55
Finally, the Illinois Act—in contrast to the California statute —
does not explicitly authorize any means by which employers may contribute to the state-operated retirement fund on behalf of their respective
56
employees.
IV. THREE LEGAL ISSUES POSED BY THE ILLINOIS ACT
In light of the foregoing, the Illinois Act poses three important legal
questions: First, will the retirement accounts established by the Illinois
private sector retirement program qualify as IRAs for purposes of the
Code? Second, will the Illinois program be an employee benefit plan for
ERISA purposes? Third, if the Illinois program is an ERISA-governed
employee benefit plan, will either the State of Illinois or Illinois employers have ERISA-based liability under that program?
A.

Will the Illinois Private Sector Retirement Accounts Qualify as IRAs
Under the Code?

Neither the Code nor ERISA explicitly defines an individual retirement account as such. Both statutes, however, outline the factors
which make for a defined-contribution “account,” as opposed to a defined-benefit pension. In particular, both the Code and ERISA specify
that for retirement purposes, the term “individual account plan” or “defined contribution plan” means a “plan which provides for an individual
account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other partici57
pants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”
The drafters of the Illinois statute embraced this definition, providing for the allocation of investment gains and losses to each account in
53. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95.
54. Id.
55. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(k).
56. Section 25(3) of the Illinois Act contemplates that the board will manage “contributions paid
by employees and employers” in accordance with traditional fiduciary standards. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
80/25(3); see also id. § 15(a) (“Moneys in the Fund shall consist of moneys received from enrollees and
participating employers . . . .”). The Act in its current form, however, provides no means for such employer contributions. The best understanding of Sections 15(a) and 25(3) is that the Act establishes
that if employer contributions are authorized in the future, such employer contributions will be managed under the same fiduciary standards as apply to employees’ contributions.
57. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2012); see also I.R.C. § 414(i) (2012). The Code’s version of this definition is identical to the ERISA version except that the tax law exclusively uses the
term “defined contribution plan.” Id.
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the Illinois program. In particular, under the Illinois Act, the board administering the state-sponsored program must “[e]stablish the process by
which interest, investment earnings, and investment losses are allocated
to individual program accounts on a pro rata basis and are computed at
58
the interest rate on the balance of an individual’s account.”
The drafters of the Illinois Act also provided for the pro rata alloca59
tion of administrative fees to individual accounts and authorized individual participants to direct the investment of the funds in their own ac60
counts. Such self-directed participant investing—like the allocation of
61
gains, losses, and expenses—is the hallmark of an individual account.
These defined contribution features of the Illinois Act contrast with
the cash-balance-style formula required by the California statute in lieu
of the direct allocation of investment gains and losses to individual ac62
counts. The notional defined-benefit accounts of the California program, credited with assumed rates of return and unreduced for invest63
ment losses, will not qualify as IRAs. The individual accounts of the
Illinois program, however, will so qualify since investment gains and
losses, as well as expenses, will be allocated directly to these accounts.
B.

Will the Illinois Program Be an Employee Benefit Plan for ERISA
Purposes?

Most of the legal controversy to date about the Illinois program has
revolved around the question of whether that program will be an
64
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan. The Illinois program will not
be an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes but will instead qualify
as an IRA payroll deposit arrangement.
65
66
The Illinois program —like the California program —is intended
to constitute a payroll-deduction IRA arrangement. DOL regulations
provide that such an IRA payroll arrangement is not an ERISAgoverned employee benefit plan if four criteria are met. First, there can
be no employer contributions under a payroll-deduction IRA arrange-

58. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(d); see also id. §§ 45, 50.
59. Id. § 30(n).
60. Id. §§ 45(a), 60(d).
61. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
62. See Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 558–59, 567–82.
63. Id. at 567–70.
64. See, e.g., Joni Andrioff & Eric G. Serron, Preemption Questions for Ill. Payroll Deduction
IRA Plan, LAW 360 (Jan. 22, 2015) (“There is a substantial question whether the Act on its face requires employers to establish an ‘employee pension benefit plan’ within the meaning of ERISA or
whether the program in operation may result in employers being deemed to have established such a
plan.”); Derek B. Dorn et al., States Dive Headfirst into Retirement Coverage Debate – But Will Their
Initiatives Run Afoul of Federal Law?, BLOOMBERG BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 2, 2015)
(“Each of the state proposals raise a series of related questions about how it would be treated under
ERISA . . . .”).
65. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (defining “[p]ayroll deposit retirement savings arrangement”); id.
§ 10.
66. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100008(a) (West 2012).
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ment. Second, “participation” must be “completely voluntary for em68
ployees” participating in the arrangement. Third, the employer’s role in
a payroll-deduction IRA arrangement must be limited to specified ministerial functions. These ministerial functions consist of the employer
“without endorsement . . . permit[ting] the sponsor to publicize the program to employees,” the employer’s “collect[ion of] contributions
through payroll deductions,” and the employer’s “remi[ssion]” of these
employee contributions “to the sponsor” for investment in each employ69
ee’s IRA. Finally, under an IRA payroll-deduction arrangement, the
employer can “receive[] no consideration in the form of cash or other70
wise.”
In discussion to date about the applicability of this regulation to the
Illinois Act, the contentious issue has been whether employees’ partici71
pation in the Illinois program is “completely voluntary.” The employees
of covered Illinois employers are automatically enrolled in the Illinois
private sector retirement program, but they can affirmatively opt out of
such participation or can elect higher or lower contributions than the
72
statutory default rate of three percent. A straightforward reading of the
73
relevant DOL regulation indicates that employees’ participation in the
Illinois plan is “completely voluntarily” since employees may readily and
without penalty leave the Illinois plan or may modify their respective
74
contribution levels. Thus, the Illinois plan qualifies as an IRA payroll
deposit arrangement rather than an employee benefit plan.
The DOL came to a similar conclusion in Field Assistance Bulletin
(“FAB”) No. 2006-02 concerning an employer-created health savings ac75
count (“HSA”). In FAB 2006-02, the DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration opined that “the establishment of an HSA by an employee [is] ‘completely voluntary’” when an employer creates and funds
an HSA as long as the employee “may move the funds to another HSA
76
or otherwise withdraw the funds.” While this informal expression of

67. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(i) (2015). The Illinois Act provides no explicit procedure for employers to supplement their employees’ contributions to the Illinois fund. The sponsor for these purposes is best understood as the board, the “committee” which would administer the Illinois plan—
though ERISA’s definition of a plan “sponsor” does not fit easily upon a state-operated private sector
retirement plan. See ERISA § 3(16)(B)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B)(iii) (2012).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(ii).
69. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(iii).
70. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(iv). Employers can, under an IRA payroll-deduction arrangement, receive “reasonable compensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions.”
Id.
71. See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
72. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(i), 55(d), 60(b)–(c), (h) (2015).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii).
74. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(i), 55(d), 60(b)–(c), (h).
75. Robert J. Doyle, Health Savings Accounts – ERISA Q&As, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO.
2006-02, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.
dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2006-2.html.
76. Id.
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administrative views is not entitled to strong deference, it is a reasonable interpretation of the Department’s own regulation and of the concept
of voluntariness in the context of employer-sponsored accounts.
Much discussion of the Illinois program has focused on the DOL’s
subsequent letter to the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) con78
cerning the Obama Administration’s myRA program. Under this program, the Treasury will establish Roth IRAs to be invested in special sav79
ings bonds. These IRAs will be funded by payroll savings deductions,
withheld by employers and remitted to the Treasury on behalf of the
80
employers’ employees. Such withholding will occur only if an employee
makes an affirmative election to authorize his employer to deduct from
81
the employee’s salary to fund a myRA for the employee. There will be
no employer contributions to myRA Roth accounts. Only the employee
will contribute to his myRA through the salary withheld and remitted by
82
his employer upon the employee’s affirmative election to contribute.
In its letter to the Treasury, the DOL concluded that the employer
who withholds for its employees’ myRA accounts will “not be establishing or maintaining an ‘employee pension benefit plan’” for ERISA pur83
poses. Among the factors buttressing the DOL’s conclusion are the
84
myRA program’s “voluntary nature.”
Some commentators have interpreted the DOL myRA letter as
suggesting that—contrary to the teaching of FAB No. 2006-02—the Illinois program is not “completely voluntary” for purposes of the DOL’s
85
regulations. An Illinois employee of a covered employer is automatically enrolled in the Illinois private sector retirement plan and must affirma86
tively opt out of the program. This, these commentators suggest, makes
77. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (2013) (“[O]pinion letters [are] not
regulations with the force of law. We have held that interpretations such as those in opinion letters—
like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of
which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference. These documents are entitled to
respect in proportion to their power to persuade.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
78. Information Letter from John J. Canary, Dir. of Regulations & Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, to J. Mark Iwry, Senior Advisor to the Sec’y & Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Ret. & Health Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (Dec. 15, 2014), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/ILs/il121514.html.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Andrioff & Serron, supra note 64 (“The myRA Letter suggests that the Illinois program may not satisfy the Safe Harbor requirement that a payroll deduction IRA be ‘completely voluntary for employees.’”); Dorn et al., supra note 64 (myRA “does not involve automatic enrollment.
And this difference could be key.”); Shaun Terrill, Is The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act
Really That Secure From the Confines Of ERISA?, BLOOMBERG BNA FEDERAL TAX BLOG (Feb. 25,
2015) (discussing the myRA letter and providing that “there is still an involuntary element present
where an employee fails to take action and automatically must make contributions equal to 3% of
wages”). Cf. October Three Consulting, LLC, The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program and the
DOL myRA letter, OCTOBER THREE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.octoberthree.com/news/article/TheIllinois-Secure-Choice-Savings-Program-and-the-DOL-myRA-letter (“[T]he letter is interesting for its
implications for programs like the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program.”).
86. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10, 30(i), 60(b) (2015).
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the Illinois program different from the myRA program which requires
the employee to affirmatively opt into the program. For these commentators, the automatic enrollment feature of the Illinois program makes employees’ participation in that program less than fully voluntary since em87
ployees must elect out of the program.
This reading of the DOL’s recent myRA letter stretches that letter
inordinately since the DOL in this letter does not discuss an automatic
enrollment program like the Illinois—or California—private sector retirement plan. But even if the DOL’s recent myRA letter implies that the
Illinois automatic enrollment feature makes the Illinois plan less than
“completely voluntary,” that is not a persuasive construction of the relevant regulation.
88
“[A]s many a curbstone philosopher has observed,” nothing is ever
completely anything. An employee contributing to a myRA has been exhorted to make that contribution by no less a personage than the Presi89
dent of the United States. It is nevertheless plausible to conclude that
an employee’s contribution to his myRA is “completely voluntary” within the meaning of the DOL’s regulations defining an IRA payroll90
deduction program.
So too an employee’s decision to remain enrolled in the Illinois private sector retirement plan is a “completely voluntarily” decision. Like
the HSA participant in FAB 2006-02, an Illinois employee who wants to
leave the state-sponsored retirement program or change his contribution
91
level can readily and without penalty do so. Thus, the Illinois plan
should—as its drafters intended—qualify as a voluntary IRA payrolldeduction arrangement and not be an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. The minimal burden of opting out of coverage does not make an
employee’s decision to stay in the Illinois program less than “completely
92
voluntary.”
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 335
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address
(Jan. 28, 2014) (“I will direct the Treasury to create a new way for working Americans to start their
own retirement savings: MyRA.”).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii) (2015).
91. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10, 30(i), 55(d).
92. Other commentators have cited the DOL’s myRA letter for the proposition that government-sponsored programs are, by their very nature, not subject to ERISA. See, e.g., October Three,
LLC, supra note 85 (discussing whether “DOL’s reasoning—that, because the myRA is a federal government program, ERISA does not apply—also appl[ies] to programs created and operated by
states”). There is indeed language in the myRA letter which can be read as supporting this position.
See Information Letter, supra note 78 (“[W]e do not believe Congress intended in enacting ERISA
that a federal government retirement savings program created and operated by the U.S. Department
of the Treasury would be subject to the extensive reporting, disclosure, fiduciary duty, or other requirements of ERISA . . . .”).
ERISA, however, explicitly defines a “governmental plan,” immune from ERISA regulation,
as a plan maintained by the federal government or by a state or local government “for its employees.”
ERISA §3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(39) (2012); see also ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (providing that ERISA does not apply to “a governmental plan”).
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If the Illinois Program Is Governed by ERISA, Will Either the State
of Illinois or Illinois Employers Be Liable under ERISA?

But let us assume that because of its automatic enrollment feature,
the Illinois program will be an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan
rather than a voluntary IRA payroll-deduction arrangement.
At this point, there is an important difference between the California Act and the Illinois statute. Under the California law—assuming that
it is confirmed by a second legislative vote—the California board is required to abandon the Golden State’s private sector retirement program
93
if that program is an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. In contrast, the Illinois board is to proceed with the Illinois plan, even if that
plan is ERISA-regulated, unless the board also concludes that “[s]tate or
94
employer liability is established under” ERISA.
ERISA’s fiduciary liability scheme applies to “a person . . . to the
extent” that such person “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of” an ERISA-governed plan or
“exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
95
of [such a plan’s] assets.” Alternatively, “a person” is a fiduciary for
ERISA purposes if such person “has any discretionary authority or dis96
cretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.”
The prospect of employer liability under ERISA can readily be
dismissed. Under the Illinois Act, employers will play only a ministerial
role in implementing the Illinois private sector retirement plan. Employers will distribute to their employees information packets developed by
97
the board administering the Illinois program. Employers will also with98
hold funds from the salaries of employees enrolled in the program. Employers will accept enrollment forms from employees who currently want
to participate in the program but who have previously declined such par99
ticipation. Illinois employers covered by the program will remit to the
100
state-operated fund the monies withheld from their employees. At no
time will any Illinois employer exercise any “discretionary” authority or
The Illinois and California plans will cover private sector employees, not public employees.
In light of ERISA’s definition of an ERISA-exempt governmental plan as one covering governmental
employees, there is no basis for inferring that the state’s sponsorship of a private sector plan is, by virtue of such government sponsorship, inherently immune from ERISA regulation. Suppose, for example, that a state-sponsored retirement plan gave each employer the right to determine the investments
available to plan participants. It would be anomalous to hold such a plan immune from ERISA because of the state’s sponsorship. In short, the Illinois program is not ERISA-governed because that
program qualifies as an IRA payroll deposit plan, not because the state sponsors that program.
93. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043 (West 2012).
94. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/95.
95. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
96. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). ERISA also defines as a “fiduciary”
certain investment advisors. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii). This definition has no
applicability to the state of Illinois or any employer since neither will be providing investment advice.
97. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(e).
98. Id. § 60(a)–(b).
99. Id. § 60(e).
100. Id. § 65.
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control over assets or plan administration which would trigger fiduciary
status—and consequent liability—under ERISA.
The conclusion is the same for the state of Illinois—no ERISA liability—but getting there is more complicated. In the first instance, an
ERISA fiduciary must be a “person,” and a state is not a “person” for
101
ERISA purposes.
Moreover, as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, ERISA distin102
guishes between “settlor” functions and “fiduciary” functions. Illinois
acts as the “settlor” of its private sector retirement plan when it decides
103
upon “the composition or design of the plan.” While “the administra104
tion of the plan’s assets” is a fiduciary function, determining “the form
105
or structure of the [p]lan” is not.
Thus, by establishing the plan and its terms—such as automatic em106
ployee enrollment, the twenty-five employee threshold for employer
107
108
coverage, the three percent default contribution rate, the right of en109
rolled employees to increase or decrease that rate —Illinois acts as a
“settlor,” not a fiduciary. Illinois, while it is the “settlor” for ERISA purposes, has no fiduciary liability under ERISA since Illinois is not a “person” which administers plan assets in a discretionary fashion or which
110
engages in discretionary acts of plan management.
In addition, in the context of a defined contribution/individual account plan, there is no fiduciary liability when a participant “exercises
111
control over the assets in his account.” The Illinois Act is drafted to
comply with this limit on fiduciary liability. Participants will invest their
own accounts’ funds from among a menu of investment options, designed
112
to comport with ERISA. If participants do not select from among these
options, the amounts in their respective Roth IRAs in the Illinois fund
will automatically be invested in a life cycle/target date default option al113
so intended to comply with ERISA.

101. Compare ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (defining “person” but not including “State”),
with ERISA § 3(10), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(10) (defining “State”).
102. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(d), 60(b) (2015).
107. Id. § 5 (defining “employer”).
108. Id. §§ 30(i), 60(c).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
111. ERISA § 404(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012).
112. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B) (2015) (requiring self-directed plans to offer
“at least three investment alternatives . . . [e]ach of which is diversified [and] . . . has materially different risk and return characteristics”), with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/45(b) (providing for “a conservative
principal protection fund,” “a growth fund,” “a secure return fund,” and “an annuity fund”).
113. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(e)(4)(i) (providing that a qualified default investment
“may be a ‘life-cycle’ or ‘targeted-retirement-date’ fund or account”), with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
80/45(a) (providing that the default investment option shall be “a life-cycle fund with a target date
based upon the age of the enrollee”).
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Finally, the Illinois Act designates the board as the group which
114
administers the plan and acts as the plan’s fiduciary.
These provisions collectively eliminate the possibility of the state
having direct liability under ERISA since the state would, for ERISA
purposes, not be a fiduciary—“a person” possessing or exercising discretionary control or authority in the administration of the plan or its assets.
At first blush, the composition of the board established by the Illinois Act potentially creates indirect liability for the state since, as a matter of state law, Illinois reimburses its agents and employees for claims
115
against them. On a closer look, however, the State of Illinois will have
no indirect liability since ERISA would preempt the operation of the Illinois reimbursement statute insofar as that statute would otherwise require the state to reimburse the members of the board administering the
state’s private sector retirement plan.
Three members of the board administering the Illinois private sector retirement plan will serve ex officio—namely, Illinois’s treasurer
116
117
(who is chairman of the board), Illinois’s comptroller, and the direc118
tor of the state Office of Management and Budget. These board members are agents and officers of the state and will serve on the board on
behalf of the state. The governor of Illinois will select the four remaining
119
board members. This selection of board members will be a discretionary act in the administration of the plan by an agent of the state, i.e., the
120
governor, and will thus potentially give rise to liability for the state. As
a matter of state law, Illinois is obligated to reimburse its employees and
agents for damages asserted against them in the performance of their of121
ficial duties.
Suppose, for example, that a gubernatorial appointee to the Illinois
board engages in a classic fiduciary lapse. Assume, for instance, that this
board member arranges for an unsuitable investment to be included in
the menu of investment options available to participants because the
board member receives kickbacks from the promoters of this investment.
Suppose further that the governor fails to monitor the performance of

114. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a) (establishing the board as the plan’s “trustee”). Moreover,
the Illinois Act imposes upon the board and its individual members fiduciary duties which track the
fiduciary duties of an ERISA fiduciary. Compare 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/25, with ERISA § 404(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a).
115. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/2(d) (2015) (providing that the state reimburses state officers, employees, or agents unless their behavior constituted “intentional, wilful[,] or wanton misconduct”).
116. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/20(a)(1). The treasurer can designate another individual to sit on
the board in his or her place. Id.
117. Id. § 20(a)(2). The comptroller can designate another individual to sit on the board in his or
her place. Id.
118. Id. § 20(a)(3). The director can designate another individual to sit on the board in his or her
place. Id.
119. Id. § 20(a)(4)–(6). The governor’s appointees must satisfy certain criteria and be confirmed
by the state treasurer and the state senate. Id. § 20(e).
120. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/2(d).
121. Id.
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this board member and thus allows the kickback scheme to continue for
an extended period of time.
If the Illinois private sector retirement plan is an ERISA-governed
arrangement, the governor might have personal fiduciary liability for his
failure to monitor his appointee’s kickback scheme—a failure of discre122
tionary plan management on the governor’s part. To the extent participants select this inappropriate investment and consequently experience
losses, the governor might be liable for his failure to oversee the performance of the individual he placed on the plan’s board. Since the gover123
nor has a claim for state reimbursement of these damages, this appears
at first glance to be a scenario in which the state, though not itself an
ERISA fiduciary, potentially has indirect liability to reimburse its employee’s ERISA-based obligations.
Or assume that the treasurer of Illinois, while not deliberately mismanaging the affairs of the fund, does not meet ERISA’s fiduciary
standard of care. Suppose, for example, that he fails to have investment
options properly vetted and, as a result, some employees lose money in
their Roth accounts.
Again, if the treasurer is required to pay damages as an ERISA fiduciary for his failure to exercise properly his discretionary authority
124
over plan investments, the state may be required to reimburse the
125
treasurer for those damages. In this scenario also, the State of Illinois
potentially winds up with indirect ERISA-based liability because of the
state’s statutory obligation to reimburse its agents and employees.
In these and similar cases, however, ERISA preempts the Illinois
reimbursement statute insofar as that statute would command the state
to pay any damages the governor or treasurer might owe for his respective failure to perform adequately as an ERISA fiduciary. ERISA section 410(a) declares as “void against public policy . . . any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under”
126
ERISA. This ERISA section prevents the Illinois reimbursement statute from making whole the governor, the treasurer, or any other board
member for any damages arising from the failure to satisfy ERISA’s
standard of fiduciary behavior. Moreover, ERISA’s preemption clause,
section 514(a), provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
127
plan” governed by ERISA. While the scope of ERISA preemption has
122. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
123. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
124. DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 418 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] fiduciary of a defined
contribution, participant-driven, 401(k) plan created to provide retirement income for employees who
is given discretion to select and maintain specific investment options for participants . . . must exercise
prudence in selecting and retaining available investment options.”).
125. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/2(d).
126. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a).
127. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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128

been controversial,
section 514(a) buttresses the conclusion that
ERISA precludes Illinois from reimbursing its officers and agents for any
claims against them based on their duties as fiduciaries of an ERISA
129
plan.
In short, if the Illinois private sector retirement program is an
ERISA-governed employee benefit plan because the automatic enrollment feature is deemed less than “completely voluntary,” neither Illinois
employers nor the state itself will have direct or indirect liability under
ERISA.
V. GOING FORWARD
In light of the foregoing, the Illinois Act passes muster under the
Code and ERISA. Unlike the formula-based, cash-balance-style accounts of the California Act, the state-mandated savings accounts to be
created under the Illinois statute will qualify as Roth IRAs under the
Code since investment losses and earnings, as well as administrative expenses, will be allocated to those accounts. The Illinois program will not
be an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan. The program will instead
be an IRA payroll deposit arrangement because employees’ participation
in that program will be voluntary. Even if the Illinois program is an
ERISA-governed plan, Illinois employers and the state itself will have no
ERISA liability because, inter alia, neither will have or will exercise discretionary authority or control over the plan or its assets.
That the Illinois Act is legally compliant with the Code and ERISA
does not mean that the Act is sound as a matter of fiscal or retirement
policy. Critics can properly note that Illinois and California have some of
130
the most ill-funded public pension plans in the country. This observation can fuel the criticism that the money contributed to these states’ private sector retirement plans is destined to bail out these states’ underfunded public employee pension plans.
The drafters and sponsors of the Illinois Act can credibly retort that
131
they have guarded against this possibility. Like the California Act, the
Illinois Act emphasizes the separation between the funds contributed by

128. FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 50, at 195–258; LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 818–905.
For some of my ruminations on ERISA preemption, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA
Preemption, and the Conundrum of the ‘Relate To’ Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917 (2001); Edward Zelinksy, Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: An Opportunity to Correct the Problems of ERISA Preemption, 101
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2015); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999).
129. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, California Public Workers May Be at Risk of Losing Promised
Pensions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015, 4:00 AM) (“Californians now owe nearly $200 billion for pensions promised to state and local government workers . . . .”); John O’Connor, Illinois Justices Press
State’s Lawyer on Pension Overhaul, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/mar/11/illinois-supreme-court-set-to-hear-states-pension-/?page=all (noting “a $111 billion
deficit” in pension funding).
131. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(b)–(d) (West 2012).
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132

private sector employees to the state-operated fund and the state itself.
Moreover, the Illinois law goes beyond these statutory guarantees—
which are subject to revision or revocation by a future legislature—by
creating bona fide IRAs. Employees participating in the Illinois plan will
routinely be told their IRA account balances and will have a sense of
133
ownership in those account balances. It will be politically implausible
for Illinois’s public officials to divert funds from these state-sponsored
Roth IRAs and thereby diminish the disclosed account balances of Illinois voters—account balances perceived by them as their vested property rights.
More persuasively, critics of laws like the California and Illinois
Acts score points when they argue that the states should solve their own
pension funding problems before they look for other retirement prob134
lems to solve. There is indeed great irony when state legislatures which
have failed to properly fund the pensions of public employees choose instead to address the private sector’s (quite real) retirement challenges.
On the other hand, the Illinois statute is, as a legal matter and policy
matter, better drafted than the California Act on which it is based. The
Illinois program’s accounts will both qualify under the Code as IRAs and
will make politically credible the statute’s assurances that funds will not
135
be diverted. Participants in the Illinois program—having their account
balances disclosed to them—will have a sense of ownership in those balances and will not look kindly upon public officials who divert funds
from those balances.
Both the California and the Illinois laws could give rise to unintended consequences. The providers of private sector retirement plans might
use the Illinois (and possible California) state mandate as a marketing
tool to sell their plans as better alternatives to the state-operated arrangements. Some proponents of the Illinois and California acts might
view that possibility as acceptable, even desirable. If the prospect of
mandated participation in the state-operated funds causes private sector
employers in Illinois or California to instead establish their own qualified
plans or IRA payroll deposit arrangements, the argument might go, the
state programs will have served their purpose of expanding private sector

132. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a) (2015) (providing that the fund established by the Act is “a
trust outside of the State treasury”); id. § 15(b) (providing that contributed funds “shall not constitute
property of the State” and “the State shall have no claim to or against, or interest in” the funds contributed by employees to their retirement accounts); id. § 50 (“The State shall have no liability for the
payment of any benefit to any participant in the Program.”); id. § 55(c)(9) (“[T]he Program Fund is
not guaranteed by the State.”); id. § 70(a) (“The State shall have no duty or liability to any party for
the payment of any retirement savings benefits accrued by any individual under the Program.”).
133. See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 97–101, 127–28 (2007).
134. See, e.g., Andrew S. Williams, Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program?, RETIREMENT PLAN
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.retirementplanblog.com/401k-plans/illinois-secure-choice-savingsprogram/ (“[T]his is Illinois, . . . a state with its own funding liability for state sponsored retirement
benefits measured in tens of billions of dollars.”).
135. See supra Part IV.A.
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retirement savings by prodding employers to adopt 401(k) and other employer-sponsored savings plans.
This possibility raises an alternative approach that other states
could pursue: a state could, without establishing a state-run retirement
fund for private sector employers, instead just mandate employers to establish their own retirement or IRA payroll plans. This is the approach
which the Obama Administration has favored—namely, to mandate IRA
136
coverage without requiring government-run IRAs. Mandating employer-sponsored retirement savings arrangements would undoubtedly receive strong political support from the providers of private sector retirement services.
Some proponents of state laws like the Illinois and California acts
would counter that state-run IRA investment plans could serve a Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”)-like function. Proponents of TVA argued that a publicly-owned utility serves as a transparent example,
demonstrating efficiencies in the provision of electrical services and pass137
ing consequent price reductions onto utility-using consumers.
Proponents of arrangements like the Illinois and California private
sector programs could, in a similar vein, tout the ability of public-run investment programs to control advisory fees and other costs. Such cost
control would serve the interests both of the participants in these statesponsored programs—assessed lower rates for administrative and investment advisory services on their retirement savings—as well as the
customers of private investment providers, as such providers will be
forced to match the lower costs of public programs.
Another potential analogy to state-run private sector retirement
plans is the defined contribution Section 529 program today ubiquitously
138
sponsored by states for college savings. The states have largely outsourced the investment of section 529 funds to private managers who
139
compete for the business of managing such funds. In a similar fashion,
the board running the Illinois fund can foster competition among investment managers for the right to invest the amounts contributed to the
140
fund.
The strongest argument for the California and Illinois state-run retirement funds is the benefit of experimentation. A strength of our fed136. Dorn et al., supra note 64 (“[T]he Automatic IRA has been the centerpiece of his administration’s retirement policy and has been included in every annual budget proposal that he has sent to
Congress.”). The authors of the mandatory IRA proposal have recently discussed the choices states
confront as they design state retirement savings programs. David C. John & William G. Gale, Structuring State Retirement Savings Plans: A Guide to Policy Design and Management Issues (Sept. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brookings Institution).
137. MARGUERITE OWEN, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 10–13 (1973) (discussing Senator George Norris’ argument that publicly-owned Ontario Hydro produced substantially cheaper electricity than U.S. private utilities).
138. On 529 programs, see ZELINSKY, supra note 133, at 64–70.
139. Id. at 67.
140. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/40(a) (2015) (describing the “open bid process” to select investment
managers “to reduce the Program’s administrative expenses”).
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eral system is that one or more states can pioneer models of public policy
and thereby generate useful information and experience for the other
states and the national government.
The desirability of state-by-state experimentation suggests that different states, rather than emulating the California and Illinois models,
should adopt alternative approaches to the problem of inadequate retirement savings. Among the other possibilities are state income tax
credits to firms establishing their own retirement savings arrangements
as well as state income tax credits to low income individuals who save
141
through 401(k) plans or IRAs. Yet another possible approach in the
spirit of experimentation is for states to refrain from any affirmative encouragement of private sector retirement savings and to instead view
such encouragement as the province of the federal government.
VI. CONCLUSION
In legal terms, the Illinois private sector retirement plan will pass
muster under both the Code and ERISA. The Illinois accounts will qualify as Roth IRAs under the Code since investment gains and losses, as
well as administrative expenses, will be allocated directly to these accounts. The Illinois program will not be an ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plan but will instead be an IRA payroll deposit arrangement. If
the Illinois arrangement is an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes, Illinois employers and the state itself will have no liability under
ERISA.
That the Illinois private sector retirement arrangement qualifies under the Code and ERISA does not mean that this arrangement is sound
as a matter of policy. The choices made by Illinois’ legislators are significant because they represent the choices of the first state to authorize a
state-operated, state-mandated private sector retirement program. Those
choices are thus an important contribution to a vital national debate, but
they will not end that debate. In that debate, I favor widespread experimentation by the states to determine which, if any, policies will effectively and efficiently encourage retirement savings.

141.

Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 592–98.

ZELINSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

192

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

1/26/2016 1:55 PM

[Vol. 2016

